Количество опыта: Дублирование мозга и степень сознания

Nick Bostrom, “Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness”, public translation into Russian from English More about this translation.

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Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness

Количество опыта: Дублирование мозга и степень сознания

History of edits (Latest: murzeichaos 7 months, 3 weeks ago) §

Mind Mach (2006) 16:185òÀÓ200

DOI 10.1007/s11023-006-9036-0

Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness

Nick Bostrom

Received: 6 December 2005 / Accepted: 24 July 2006 / Published online: 26 August 2006

(c) Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

**Abstract:** If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" thought experiment.

**Keywords:** Computation, Mind, Consciousness, Implementation, Duplication, Fading qualia, Chalmers, Searle, Program, Probabilistic, Deterministic.

+ The duplication thesis

Suppose two brains are in the same conscious state. Are there two minds, two streams of conscious experiences? Or only one?

From a physical point of view, there is no puzzle. There are two numerically distinct lumps of matter that instantiate the same patterns and undergo qualitatively identical processes. The question is how we should ascribe mental properties to this material configuration. Even if we assume that the mental supervenes on the physical, we still need to determine whether the supervenience relation is such that two qualitatively identical physical systems ground a single experience or two numerically distinct (albeit subjectively indistinguishable) experiences.

The issue is not about personal identity. It is a separate question whether there would be one or two persons. One might hold, for example, that one person could have two subjectively indistinguishable experiences at the same time, or that two persons could literally share what is, numerically and not just qualitatively, one experience. These issues about personal identity will not be discussed here. My concern, rather, is about "qualia identity". I will start by considering the numerical identity or non-identity of the phenomenal experiences that arise when brains exist in duplicates. The bulk of the paper will then examine some intriguing cases involving partial brain-duplication and the questions of degrees and of quantity of experience that these cases force us to confront.

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© (c) Nick Bostrom.